Comparative research on racial classification has often turned to Latin America, where race is thought to be particularly fluid. Using nationally representative data from the 2010 and 2012 America's Barometer survey, the authors examine patterns of self-identification in four countries. National differences in the relation between skin color, socioeconomic status, and race were found. Skin color predicts race closely in Panama but loosely in the Dominican Republic. Moreover, despite the dominant belief that money whitens, the authors discover that status polarizes ðBrazilÞ, mestizoizes ðColombiaÞ, darkens ðDomin-ican RepublicÞ, or has no effect ðPanamaÞ. The results show that race is both physical and cultural, with country variations in racial schema that reflect specific historical and political trajectories.
Like African-Americans in the United States, Afro-Latin Americans are descended primarily from enslaved Africans brought to the Americas; they live in societies where whiteness is privileged, and they continue to be overrepresented at the bottom of the social hierarchy ðWade 1993; Andrews 2004; Sawyer 2005Þ . Despite these basic similarities, scholars have noted the general absence of institutional racial classification systems in Latin American countries, resulting in blurred or ambiguous boundaries around racial categories and allowing people to move in and out of them ðDegler 1971 ; Wright 1990; Wade 1993; Telles 2004Þ . Racial classification in Latin American countries also appears to have these distinctive features: a focus on appearance rather than origin as the primary criterion, the common use of intermediate or mixed-race categories, and, thus, classification on a color continuum. While most scholarly findings about racial classification are limited to specific countries in the region, some scholars have made region-wide claims that gloss over national differences, often juxtaposing Latin American countries to the United States ðHoetink 1967; Van den Berghe 1967; Harris 1974; Bonilla Silva 2004; Patterson 2005Þ. However, Latin America is far from homogenous. Indeed, there has been substantial variation in the racial trajectories of countries in this region, including the place of blackness in the nation and the extent to which race was institutionalized in the law. First, while many Latin American countries adopted nation-building narratives of race mixture, or mestizaje, countries like Argentina and Costa Rica did not. A second difference was the role that African ancestry and "blood" were thought to play in the nation. In Brazil, race mixture narratives held that blacks and African culture were central to the nation; in Colombia, they ignored or downplayed blackness while greatly valuing whiteness; and, in the Dominican Republic, they excluded blacks and African culture by regarding them as backward and foreign ðSkidmore 1974; Wade 1993; Telles 2004; Candelario 2007; Simmons 2009Þ . Moreover, while most Latin American countries did not adopt racially exclusionary laws upon independence, Panama did have a history of segregation and formal racial exclusion resembling that in the United States ðO'Reggio 2006Þ. If we span the region today, we also see differences in the extent to which Latin American countries have adopted multicultural and race-conscious policies. Indeed, while Brazil has adopted robust reforms, in cases like the Dominican Republic, no such policies exist.
Until recently, most research on racial classification in Latin America focused on Brazil; there have been no systematic within-region comparisons. Even in the case of Brazil itself, the scholarship reveals a dynamic racial classification system. While traditional race scholarship in Brazil showed that racial fluidity has allowed individuals to avoid identifying as black by effectively "whitening" themselves ðHarris 1952; Degler 1971; Twine 1997; Daniel 2006Þ , recent research shows a new pattern of "darkening" ðPaixão et al. 2011 ; Marteleto 2012; Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 2013Þ , apparently in response to Brazil's new era of affirmative action and racial consciousness.
In this article, we argue that national dynamics-both historical and contemporary-are important for explaining disparate patterns of racial identification. We analyze distinctive patterns of racial identification in Brazil, Colombia, Panama, and the Dominican Republic. These represent four of the six Latin American countries with the highest percentage of people identifying as black or in mixed-race categories that denote some African origin ðmulato or pardoÞ.
2 We use nationally representative data to analyze patterns of racial identification in each country, particularly ð1Þ the relation between skin color and racial identification, ð2Þ the use of mixed-race categories, and ð3Þ the effects of status on racial identification. We evaluate these racial identification questions in light of a relatively objective measure of skin color and use the concept of racial schemas to refer to the distinct national patterns of identification along these dimensions. We also analyze the effect of hair type on racial identification in Brazil.
We found that racial identification in Latin America varies widely. While skin color was the most important predictor of racial identification in all four countries, the strength of its effect varied; the proportion of the darkest persons who identified as black ranged from 50% ðDominican RepublicÞ to 90% ðPanamaÞ, with Colombia and Brazil in between, revealing differing degrees of fluidity in each country's racial schemas. This also suggests that, while racial identification in Latin American countries is guided by perceived physical referents, such referents are culturally interpreted. For example, dark-skinned persons who did not identify as black generally identified as mixed race ðpardo and mulatoÞ and, in the Dominican Republic, as Indio or mestizo.
We also found that social status was an important predictor of racial identification, although not in the direction scholars might have predicted. Instead of "money whitening"-an idea prevalent in the traditional literature and among ordinary people in the region-we found four distinct patterns: polarization, or the tendency for higher-status persons to both whiten and blacken ðBrazilÞ; mestizoization, or the tendency for high-status persons to identify as mestizo rather than in lighter or darker categories ðCo-lombiaÞ; darkening, or the tendency for high-status individuals to identify in darker categories throughout the continuum of racial categories ðDo-minican RepublicÞ; and no status effects ðPanamaÞ. We argue that the racial schema in each of these countries-specifically, the relation between color and status with racial identification and the use of mixed-race categoriesreflects the country's distinct sets of historical and contemporary inducements ðHoetink 1967; Omi and Winant 1994; Wimmer 2002Þ .
PATTERNED RACIAL FLUIDITY IN LATIN AMERICA
Any discussion of racial identification in Latin America must be contextualized in the experience of colonization, slavery, and nationalist narratives that emphasized race mixture. Fifteen times as many Africans were taken as slaves to Portuguese and Spanish America as to the United States ðEltis 2011Þ. According to Andrews ð2004, p. 41Þ, free and enslaved blacks and mulatos comprised majorities in Brazil, Venezuela, Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Panama around 1800 and accounted for more than one-third of the Colombian and Argentine populations. Unlike the United States, where family immigration to the American colonies predominated, Spanish and Portuguese immigration during the colonial period involved mostly men who procreated ðoften forciblyÞ with indigenous, black, and mulato women. Some have argued that the greater Iberian acceptance of nonwhites may also help to explain the high degree of race mixture in this region ðFreyre 1933; Socolow 2000Þ. While racial mixing happened throughout Latin America and in the United States, mixed-race individuals in the former were more often acknowledged as such ðDegler 1971; Nobles 2000Þ.
Yet the prevalence of race mixture itself did not preclude racial hierarchies; the absence of racial classification laws may also have allowed some to whiten themselves to attain greater social benefits. In the 17th and 18th centuries, colonial elites in Spanish America often created caste systems ðcastasÞ that used a variety of criteria-especially the extent of Spanish, African, and indigenous mixture-to locate people in social hierarchies ðMörner 1967; Fradera 2010Þ. By the second half of the 19th century, race thinking reached its apex as the elites of the newly independent countries in the region became increasingly concerned that their large nonwhite populations presented liabilities to national development and international recognition of their sovereignty ðSkidmore 1974; Stepan 1993Þ. This concern was based, in part, on then-current science: the early formation of many Latin American nations coincided with the period of scientific racism, which perceived African, indigenous, and mixed-race populations as degenerate and linked ideas about a nation's progress, fitness for modernity, and sovereignty to race and heredity ðSkidmore 1974; Stepan 1993; Loveman 2009Þ . In response, Latin American states such as Brazil sought to reverse nonwhite demographic predominance by whitening, which consisted of encouraging European immigration, and, betting on a neo-Larmarkian idea of constructive miscegeBlack, White, or Mixed Race? nation in which white genes were believed to be stronger, by urging further race mixture in order to create a whiter population ðSkidmore 1974; Stepan 1993Þ.
Racial Schemas
In this article, we borrow Roth's ð2012Þ notion of racial schemas in order to better understand similarities and differences in patterns of racial identification across the four countries we analyze. This approach is part of a larger cognitive turn in sociology. For example, DiMaggio ð1996Þ called for applying cognitive research in psychology to social classification using psychology's concept of schema, which refers to shared representations of knowledge and to the mechanisms used to simplify cognition. Psychological anthropologists Hirshfield ð1996Þ and Gil-White ð2001aÞ argued that underlying cognitive mechanisms are responsible for reproducing racial concepts. Brubaker ð2009, p. 34Þ contended that racial/ethnic classification is socially learned and thus may vary across cultures, becoming "ways-both institutionalized and informal-of recognizing identifying and classifying other people, of construing sameness and difference, and of 'coding' and making sense of their actions."
Roth ð2012, p. 12Þ defined racial schema as "a bundle of racial categories and the set of rules for what they mean, how they are ordered, and how to apply them to oneself and others." More to the point, she argued that these racial schemas are shared among people within a given nation. In her empirical work, she observed the cognitive dissonance that occurs when Dominicans and Puerto Ricans immigrate to the United States and experience a racial schema that differs from the one in their own countries.
Although earlier work on race in Latin America did not refer specifically to schemas, Hoetink ð1967, p. 120Þ proposed the "somatic norm," defined as "the complex of physical ðsomaticÞ characteristics which is accepted by a group as its norm and ideal" instead of "race," which he believed is falsely based in biology. He found that somatic norms, such as those regarding who is considered white or black, varied between the Spanishspeaking Caribbean and the Caribbean colonized by the Dutch, French, and English. By analyzing the patterns and informal rules around membership in particular racial categories, as well as the specific historical conditions that gave rise to these systems, these works have all examined similarities and differences in racial schemas throughout Latin America.
Defining Racial Fluidity
While debates about the nature of race relations in Latin American countries are ongoing, most scholars agree that the region can generally be unAmerican Journal of Sociology derstood as one with some level of fluidity in racial boundaries. This manifests in several ways. First, while ancestry plays some role in determining racial identification in that individuals resemble their ancestors, ancestry is generally not the main factor shaping racial identities. In contrast to the United States, where the historic one-drop rule meant that those with any black ancestors were considered black ðDavis 2010Þ, blackness is not inherited in the same way in much of Latin America. Instead, one's physical features, especially skin color, serve as a major determinant of racial classification and stratification ðNogueira 1955; Gravlee 2005; Guimarães 2012; Telles and Steele 2012; Telles and PERLA 2014Þ. One could very easily have a black parent and identify as nonblack without it being understood as "passing."
3 In Brazil, for example, scholars have found that a considerable percentage of self-identified whites reported having African ancestry ðTelles 2004Þ. Moreover, the racial identification of one's parents did not always lead to the expected racial identification for the children ðTelles 2004; Schwartzman 2007Þ. This tenuous relationship between ancestry and racial identification opens up the possibility for a kind of racial fluidity across generations, in addition to other forms of fluidity.
As a result, scholars of race in Latin America have identified a number of different kinds of racial fluidity, including temporal, contextual, referential, and categorical fluidity. 4 The first two forms refer to the racial fluidity that occurs when individuals change their racial identification either across situations or contexts ðsituational/contextual fluidityÞ or over time ðtem-poral fluidityÞ. Loveman and Muniz ð2007Þ, for example, found that the same individuals changed their racial identification over time in Puerto Rico, while several others have found this for Brazil ðCarvalho, Wood, and Andrade 2004; Paixão et al. 2011; Marteleto 2012; Francis and TannuriPianto 2013Þ and the United States ðSaperstein and Penner 2012Þ; these classification shifts thus affect official population estimates by race. Moving in and out of racial categories is best understood as a kind of temporal fluidity that may at once signal a lack of rigidity in racial identification or changes in the boundaries around racial categories themselves. While such fluidity has been at the center of race research in Latin America, research on the United States has shown that racial identification is often flexible for 3 The notion of passing as a deceptive practice is somewhat foreign to Latin American countries. This is in part because, while whiteness is highly valued in these countries, historically there has not been the same obsession with white purity as in the United States. See Davis ð2001Þ for an in-depth discussion of the one-drop rule. 4 We use "ambiguity" and "fluidity" interchangeably here as does most of the literature. The idea is simply that racial identification and classification are not rigid or fixed. It is also important to note that while these different kinds of racial fluidity are somewhat analytically distinct, they are interconnected such that one form of racial fluidity typically exists alongside other forms of racial fluidity.
Latinos and multiracials but relatively fixed and static in the black/white case ðRodriguez 2000; Harris and Sim 2002; see Saperstein and Penner ½2012 for an exceptionÞ.
The other two forms of racial fluidity are best captured in Harris's ð1970Þ work on Brazil in which he introduced the idea of "referential ambiguity" and "categorical ambiguity." The former refers to the ambiguity around who fits in which racial categories. For example, the same person may be racially classified in different categories by different people ðHarris 1970Þ or a person's self-identification may be distinct from classification by others ðTelles and Lim 1998Þ. In contrast, categorical ambiguity captures the blurriness around, and the lack of consensus about, the boundaries of racial categories themselves. This type of ambiguity is especially relevant to mixed-race categories, which scholars have argued are more likely to be defined ambiguously ðHarris 1970; Telles 2004Þ. 5 For instance, evidence from Brazil shows that ambiguity is much greater between mixed-race and black classifications than between white and nonwhite ðCarvalho et al. Bailey and Telles 2006Þ. In this article, we build on the concept of racial schemas by operationalizing it in new ways. In so doing, we focus on a specific kind of categorical ambiguity that we call color elasticity, or the extent to which skin color maps directly onto racial identification. When color elasticity is high, skin color is not a reliable predictor of racial identification; when it is low, skin color maps more directly onto racial identification. With this construct, we tease out the extent to which the categorical ambiguity that scholars have found simply reflects a blurriness of racial categories or other intervening factors beyond skin color.
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Whitening and Social Status Scholars have noted that informal rules around racial identification in Latin American countries are often governed by a whitening logic in which there is a tendency to avoid categories like "black" and "indigenous" because they are systematically devalued in society ðTwine 1997; Wade 1999; Telles 2004Þ. The prominence of popular expressions throughout Latin America such as "bettering the race," which refers to marrying lighter, and pejorative expressions like "Don't be an Indian" and "It had to be a black person" strongly signal the undesirability of nonwhite categories. Dark-skinned persons may 5 In Brazil, e.g., the popular moreno category is particularly ambiguous and refers to persons throughout the color continuum ðTelles 2004Þ. 6 While we understand that skin color is not the only marker of perceived racial difference, scholars have noted that it is perhaps the most important marker ðe.g., Harris 1970; Blair and Judd 2010; Guimarães 2012Þ. identify as white, but, more often, they identify in mixed-race categories like mestizo, mulato, moreno, and pardo. These intermediate categories simultaneously emphasize social values of race mixture and proximity to whiteness. This tendency, paired with a certain tolerance for ambiguity, has been shown not only to permit but to encourage self-classification in lighter categories. Any hint of whiteness, such as a narrow nose, a white ancestor, or perhaps high social status, has been used to whiten one's racial classification ðWright 1990; Guimarães 2008Þ.
Similarly, scholars have also found that whitening practices have often been mediated by social status. 7 In this mechanism, individuals who are upwardly mobile or of high status may be allowed to classify in whiter racial categories in ways that do not violate social norms. This relationship is perhaps best captured in the popular adage "money whitens." This idea of money whitening likely has deep historical roots. It may be linked to the practice of "gracias al sacar," whereby people-typically mixed-race free persons who had accumulated enough resources-in colonial Latin America with its castas system would purchase certificates of whiteness from the crown Hutchinson 1952Þ first claimed that the "white" category included mulatos of average or above-average wealth as well as wealthy blacks. These findings were enshrined in Degler's ð1971Þ classic Neither Black Nor White, subsequently becoming widely accepted. Similarly, discussing the Dominican Republic, Howard argued that "more affluent Dominicans invariably use lighter color terminology to describe themselves, such as blanco/a and trigueño/a, as well as Indio/a, if qualified by lighter adjectives such as claro/a" ð2001, p. 69Þ. These examples suggest that high socioeconomic status tends to be associated with whiteness, or at the very least with nonblackness. For these reasons, scholars have argued that socioeconomic status is one of the most important factors beyond phenotype that shapes the rules around racial classification in Latin American countries.
Even so, a number of scholars have begun to reexamine the degree of racial fluidity in Latin America, including the findings about whitening ðGil-White 2001b; Sheriff 2001; Golash-Boza 2010Þ; evidence suggests that this practice has not necessarily been present in all Latin American countries. Wade ð1993Þ argued that, while whiteness was certainly associated with status in Colombia, actual reclassification was possible only for a small number of persons whose physical appearance straddled adjoining racial categories. In other cases, scholars have argued that whitening did not happen at all. In her ethnographic study of a Peruvian region where Afro-descendants predominate, Golash-Boza ð2010Þ contended that no amount of status could whiten racial identification in that context.
Gender and Racial Identification
In addition to socioeconomic status, gender may also be important in shaping patterns of racial identification. Indeed, scholars have argued that racialization is often a highly gendered process that shapes the lived experiences of men and women in distinct ways ðViveros 2000Þ. More specifically, scholars have shown that while there is an overall premium on lighter skin, straighter hair, and more European features throughout Latin America, women are subjected to this standard of beauty much more than men, especially around hair (Figuereido 1994; Caldwell 2007; Candelario 2007Þ . Moreover, racial categories in Latin America are often themselves gendered, with some largely understood as feminine and others as masculine.
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All of this, paired with the fact that racial identification can be particularly fluid in Latin America, suggests that men and women could have very distinct patterns of racial identification.
Taken together, the literature on race in Latin American countries has begun to outline the contours of racial schemas in this region. What the region seems to share is a relatively high degree of racial fluidity, particularly when compared to the United States. The scholarship also suggests that Latin American racial schemas may converge in that they are regulated by a whitening logic and also mediated by social status and gender. Yet while the scholarship reveals some similarities, it also points to some key differences in the informal rules around racial classification within the region. We believe these differences have as much to do with historical context as contemporary social and political processes. We now discuss how a number of these national-level factors shape racial schemas in the four Latin American countries we analyze here.
Explaining National Racial Schemas
Nation-building narratives and state policies.-Existing research on Latin America has underscored the importance of a number of actorspolitical elites, civil society actors, and ordinary citizens-in shaping the racial schemas of each of the countries we examine ðNobles 2000; Ferrandez and Kandolfer 2012Þ. 10 The role of national narratives is especially important. While political elites in countries like Argentina and Costa Rica developed modernizing nation-building projects centered on whiteness, elites in most Latin American countries adopted narratives of mestizaje. In these latter cases, elites venerated mixture and the symbols of European, indigenous, and to a lesser extent African contributions to the nation. In so doing, these nations touted their racial mixture as proof of their racial tolerance and moral superiority over the United States, where elites promoted racial purity and segregation ðSkidmore 1974; Moya Pons 1986; SotoQuirós and Díaz-Arias 2006Þ. Mestizaje ideas were shared across Latin American nations and adapted to each country's particular demographic, political, and ideological circumstances, particularly as scientific racism was becoming discredited across the Western world and its arguments waned as barriers to national prospects for development ðGraham 1990; Stepan 1993Þ. Yet, as a number of scholars have argued and as we indicated previously, inherent in mestizaje discourse was a de facto racial hierarchy and a whitening logic ðWade 1993Þ.
Nation-building discourses have also varied with respect to the place they assign to blacks. For instance, while African culture was central to the mestizaje narratives in Brazil ðSkidmore 1974; Telles 2004Þ, Cuba ðDe la Fuente 2001Þ, and Puerto Rico ðGodreau 2002Þ, it was largely absent in the rest of Latin America ðSkidmore 1974; Gudmundson 1984; Conniff 1985; Purcell 1993; Wade 1993; Putnam 1999 Panamanian political elites developed a similar nationalist ideology that emphasized the crisol, or "crucible," of the races, denoting the mixture between Spanish, indigenous, and sometimes African blood and culture ðPriest-ley and Barrow 2008Þ. However, such discourses also developed alongside a system of racial segregation, at least in the Canal Zone ðPriestley and Barrow 2008Þ. In this respect, O'Reggio ð2006, p. 10Þ argued that Panama operated as a "living laboratory of U.S. race relations in Latin America." Indeed, throughout much of the 20th century the country was controlled by the United States, which replicated the Jim Crow system, particularly in the canal region of the country. In so doing, the U.S. government replaced Panama's more ambiguous racial classification with multiple categories with a racebased dual wage system that existed up until the 1960s. Moreover, still under U.S. occupation, the country revoked the Panamanian citizenship of West These various elite-led narratives drew symbolic boundaries that determined who should be included in or excluded from the nation, who belonged in which categories, and which racial categories were most valued ðWimmer 2013Þ. This has likely helped to form countries' distinct racial classification systems, with their own particular racial schemas and levels of fluidity. By not defining racial categories and by making mixedness central in defining the nation, Latin American states have played an important role in the making of complex informal rules and practices of racial identification in their societies. As the Brazilian case has shown, the dominant narratives of race mixture have been widely accepted as defining the Brazilian people ðSkidmore 1974; Telles 2004Þ. As Swidler ð1986Þ has theorized, such national narratives or myths create cultural repertoires or "common sense" on which individuals draw and that, in turn, pattern social actions. However, these national narratives, which were dominant throughout much of the 20th century, have begun to change.
Multiculturalism and black movement mobilization.-Beginning in the late 1980s, Latin American countries began to experience a dramatic shift in nationalist narratives, which some have called "the multicultural turn" Through constitutional reform processes, Latin American states began not only to recognize cultural diversity but to guarantee the rights of black and indigenous peoples. While some scholars have argued that this newly found multicultural citizenship is limited, others have held that these reforms do indeed challenge the privileging of ethnoracial mixture while undermining once prevalent claims of ethnic homogeneity ðsee Hale 2002Þ. Indeed, in contrast to mestizaje discourse, this new mode of multicultural citizenship privileges ideas of cultural difference, even if in so doing they obscure other issues, like racial discrimination ðHooker 2005Þ. We argue that these changes in nationalist narratives have affected racial schemas.
Although nearly every constitution in Latin America now recognizes multicultural rights for indigenous peoples, only in seven cases have rights been granted to Afro-descendant populations ðHooker 2005Þ.
13 Most notably, rights were granted to indigenous communities and to geographically concentrated black rural communities. Among the many rights recognized for these populations were collective land rights, the right to political autonomy, and alternative development ðHooker 2005Þ. When we examine our four cases more closely, we find divergent patterns of multicultural reforms. While collective rights for rural black people are guaranteed in both Colombia and Brazil, they have been particularly strong in the former where ideas of cultural difference mapped on to local understandings of blackness as associated with particular regions ðWade 1993; Paschel 2010Þ. In addition, both Colombia and Brazil instituted affirmative action policies in higher education, and state officials have publicly recognized racism as a major social problem in their countries.
14 In contrast, Panama and the Dominican Republic have not adopted reforms, although there are other signs that racial discourse may be changing in those countries ðPriestly and Barrow 2008; Simmons 2009Þ.
Changes in racial identification may also be a consequence of mobilization by black and indigenous political movements, arguably the main promoters of multiculturalism ðGrueso, Escobar, and Rosero 1998; Yashar 13 Hooker ð2005Þ reported six countries, but, since Hooker's article, Bolivia has granted multicultural rights to Afro-descendants. 14 However, affirmative action has been extended to most public universities in Brazil compared to a small number of universities in Colombia ðTelles 2004Þ.
2005; Paschel and Sawyer 2008Þ. Beyond pressuring the state to adopt multicultural and antiracism legislation, these movements have also focused on challenging dominant discourses of race and nation in these countries and encouraging persons of African origin to identify as black ðNobles 2000; Telles 2004; Paschel 2013Þ. Throughout Latin America, black movements have sought to broaden the popular conception of blackness beyond the very darkest persons while also decoupling it from negative stereotypes. However, the movements' intensity varies by country, with Brazil having the most organized movement, and Dominican Republic, the least. Scholars have argued that these movements have had a direct impact on racial classification. Paixão et al. ð2011Þ and Marteleto ð2012Þ, for example, have shown an overall darkening of racial identification in recent years for Brazil, which is reflected in the now-common sight of Afro-descendant college students of various colors sporting T-shirts that read "100% negro ½black." Taken together, these accounts suggest that the adoption of specific policies for black populations and the upsurge in black consciousness movements are undermining the whitening logic, at least in Brazil.
Changing racial schemas.-With this in mind, we want to suggest that while racial schemas are difficult to change, they are malleable. , and bottom-up social processes ðLoveman and Muniz 2007Þ shape and reshape the racial schemas that ordinary people use. The ever-expanding literature on multicultural reforms in Latin America only alludes to how they might be changing patterns of identification ðSchwartzman 2007Þ. Scholars have focused, instead, on other important aspects of the contemporary period, including the content of, and politics around, multicultural reforms. While identity is central to these analyses, there has been a greater focus on understanding blackness and indigenity as political phenomena rather than identity ðRahier 2012Þ.
State policies-whether they are the explicitly exclusionary policies of the past or the more inclusionary ones of the present-can harden racial classification and potentially change the relation between racial identification and socioeconomic status. More specifically, instituting such policies has probably increased the value of nonwhite racial categories. Policies like affirmative action may even provide material benefits to citizens identifying in those categories. For example, Francis and Tannuri-Pianto ð2013Þ have shown that some university applicants in Brazil have reclassified themselves as nonwhite to qualify for affirmative action slots. In particular, while traditional mestizaje narratives have encouraged dark-skinned individuals to use mixed-race categories and whiten where they have high social status, the recent shift to multiculturalism may have stabilized or even reversed the relation between status and racial identification, creating a new tendency toward blackening/darkening.
Even in the Dominican Republic, where the black movement is weak and legislative reforms have not occurred, scholars have noted recent changes in racial identification patterns. Howard ð2001, p. 69Þ, for example, has argued that educated Dominicans were beginning to experiment with mulato identity, and Roth ð2012Þ found that Dominican immigrants to the United States incorporate elements of U.S. racial classification, where they are often perceived as black. Similarly, in her ethnographic work, Simmons ð2009Þ held that Dominicans have recently begun to challenge traditional racial identities of whitening and classification as Indio by slowly embracing blackness. Scholars have argued that these changes in racial classification in the Dominican Republic are directly linked to out-migration to the United States and transnationalism among these immigrants ðSimmons 2009; Roth 2012Þ.
These recent findings raise many questions about the extent to which racial fluidity and whitening practices continue to exist in Latin American countries and whether there are similarities among these countries within the region. We believe that one way of better understanding the nature of these countries' racial schemas is to systematically analyze their relative level of racial fluidity. In this, we understand racial schemas as varying on a continuum from rigid to fluid, with most countries lying somewhere between the two extremes. When all forms of racial fluidity that we discussed above-contextual, temporal, referential, and categorical-are high, the racial schema can be said to be particularly fluid. When they are low, it is relatively fixed. Using unprecedented data and a comparative lens, we analyze racial schemas, paying special attention to categorical ambiguity.
RESEARCH DESIGN

Data
For our primary analysis, we used a series of national probability sample surveys from the 2010 and 2012 America's Barometer data, which were collected by the Latin American Public Opinion Project ðLAPOPÞ based at Vanderbilt University. These surveys feature an ethnicity module designed by the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America ðPERLAÞ at Princeton University. In 2010 and 2012 America's Barometer conducted face-toface surveys of adults in all Latin American countries except Cuba. We also conducted an ancillary analysis, in which we used a 2010 national probability sample of Brazil collected under the auspices of PERLA, which includes a hair type variable. For both sets of surveys, sampling was stratified in four stages and based on the most recent population distributions available Black, White, or Mixed Race?
ðusually the national censusÞ. The surveys were implemented by leading survey firms in each country and closely monitored by LAPOP. 15 The Princeton PERLA survey followed a similar methodology and was conducted by Instituto Analisé as one of their monthly national surveys, which include political and marketing polls.
We used the America's Barometer data for Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Panama, four of the five countries in which blacks and mulatos together comprised at least 10% of the LAPOP samples. 16 We did not include Venezuela because it uses different racial categories, including the particularly ambiguous moreno category in which about 50% of the Venezuelan population identifies.
17 LAPOP did not survey Cuba, where 34.5% of the population identified as black ðnegroÞ in the 2002 census ðDel Popolo 2008Þ.
In all four countries, the indigenous population was smaller than the Afro-descendant population, as table 1 shows. In our analysis, therefore, we excluded the small proportion of persons in these countries who identified as "indigenous" or spoke an indigenous language, as well as those who identified as "other." The combined sample size from the two surveys was about 4,000 in Brazil and 3,000 in the other three countries; our actual study sample was somewhat smaller because we excluded indigenous and others and cases with missing data.
Dependent Variables
The complexities of racial categorization in the region are considerable and are heightened by the cross-national differences. Therefore, in asking respondents about their racial identification, we used a standard set of racial categories in the three Spanish-speaking countries ðPanama, Colombia, and Dominican RepublicÞ and equivalent terms in Portuguese for Brazil. We also used self-identification, rather than interviewer classification, since that has become the standard mode of classification in national censuses across the world ðLoveman and Muniz 2007; Morning 2008Þ and is the basis of the incipient race-based redistributive policies in Latin America. Although classification by others may better capture referential ambiguity and discrimination, self-identity is arguably more important for understanding such factors as political mobilization and self-esteem. On the other hand, also know that self-identification largely reflects how one is classified by others although an individual's choice of an ethnoracial category may also reflect respondents' understanding of its meaning and utility ðNagel 1994; Jenkins 1998; Telles 2004Þ.
The dependent variable in our main statistical analysis was selfidentification as either white or black as compared to pardo in Brazil and white, black, or mulato as compared to mestizo in the Spanish-speaking countries. The dependent variable for Brazil was drawn from a question that resembles its national census: "Do you consider yourself white, black ðpretoÞ, pardo, indigenous or yellow." 18 In the Spanish-speaking countries, the dependent variables were based on the survey question, "Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, black ðnegroÞ, mulato or other?" In the Dominican Republic, interviewers prompted respondents with the more popular term Indio ðIndianÞ, which is sometimes thought to refer to a bronze color rather than indigenous ancestry ðCandelario 2007Þ, if respondents did not understand mestizo. The term indígena ðindigenousÞ was not used in that country since the consensus is that there is no remaining indigenous population ðMoya Pons 1986Þ. The actual term used for black in the surveys was preto in Portuguese and negro in Spanish, both of which typically refer to the darkest and most "African-looking" individuals.
Mulato is commonly understood in Spanish and Portuguese as someone of mixed European and African ancestry or who is phenotypically between "black" and "white" ðGravlee 2005Þ. Although mulato is also used in Brazil ðStephens 1999Þ, the census uses the term pardo. Pardo literally means "brown" or "gray" and commonly refers to people who are mixed in general and do not fit clearly into the white, negro, or indigenous categories ðSte-phens 1999; Nobles 2000; Guimarães 2008Þ. Unlike the Spanish-speaking countries, a mestizo or mestizo-like category was not used in Brazil.
Independent Variables
Our principal independent variables were skin color, education, and wealth. Our analysis of racial classification is novel because it employs a skin color variable. Since race is predominately defined by color/phenotype, studies that examine the effects of variables like status on racial classification or identification could attribute those effects erroneously if phenotype is not controlled. To assess skin color, interviewers for the America's Barometer survey rated the facial skin color of each respondent according to a skin color palette, which was not shown to the respondent. 19 The palette included 11 skin tones ð1 5 lightest, 11 5 darkestÞ, which came from Internet photographs; the palette was extensively pretested for interviewers' ease of use and to see whether it covered the range of colors found in the field. Although interviewer-rated skin color has been used in several surveys about racial discrimination and racial attitudes in the United States ðKeith and Herring 1991; Gullickson 2005Þ, to our knowledge it has not been used in nationally representative studies of Latin American countries. We controlled for the color of the interviewer ða continuous variable, which was rated by the interviewer supervisorÞ to capture possible interviewer bias. Although skin color evaluations by interviewers are not perfect, we believe they closely capture actual color in the majority of cases. In a related study, Hill ð2002Þ found that black and white interviewers in the United States differed in how they coded respondents' color. Instead, this study directly examines how interviewer's color affected how respondents racially identified themselves, although an interviewer's color may indirectly affect their ratings of a respondent's color. In addition, our ancillary analysis introduces a dichotomous hair type variable of kinky versus nonkinky, to further capture phenotypic variation.
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Wealth and education were indicators of socioeconomic status: on the basis of the classic status/money whitening effect, we hypothesized that persons with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to identify in lighter categories, as "money whitens" suggests. We used a relative wealth measure developed by LAPOP, which is based on a weighted index of possessing any of 14 household assets such as a refrigerator, an Internet connection, a washing machine, a computer, and a car ðCordova 2008Þ.
21
Using principal components analysis, the wealth index weights luxury items more, taking the distribution of assets in urban and rural areas within a given country into account, in order to reflect each country's economic conditions across urban and rural areas. Scholars have shown that, especially in the developing world, expenditure-based economic indicators are more reliable than indexes that are income based, for various reasons including misreporting and underreporting of income ðFilmer and Pritchett 1999; Torche and Spilerman 2009Þ. Education, a more straightforward measure of socioeconomic status, consisted of three levels: low ðless than elementary school completeÞ, medium ðhigh school completeÞ, and high ðsome college or college completeÞ.
We included additional independent variables as controls since they could potentially affect racial identification; these were age, gender, urban/ rural residence, and color of interviewer. Age was a continuous vari-able, and gender and urban/rural were dichotomous. Color of interviewer used the same 11-point scale as used to rate respondents' color. We also controlled for whether respondents participated in the 2012 or 2010 survey, mostly because sampling design may have changed between the two surveys.
Method
We begin our analysis with descriptive statistics, examining the distribution of persons by racial self-identification ðtable 1Þ and illustrating the relation between racial self-identification and skin color ðfig. 1Þ in each of the four countries. We show summary statistics in table 2. We then proceed to multinomial logistic regression to predict identification as white, mulato, or black, compared to mestizo/pardo ðtable 3Þ, revealing the relative effect of skin color among the four countries. We present odds ratios to assess the comparative effects of the independent variables. ðTable A1 presents similar regressions as table 3 except that it predicts identification as white, mestizo, or black with mulato/pardo as the reference. Tables A2 and A3 add coefficients examining the effect of immigration to the United States.Þ Finally, we illustrate and compare the effects of socioeconomic status ði.e., the combined effects of education and wealthÞ for each country ðfig. 2Þ using predicted probabilities.
To model status effects, we use regression analysis and our crosssectional data to compare the racial identification of persons having high and low levels of wealth and education but having the same skin color, age, sex, and so on. We believe this method provides a reasonable estimation of status whitening effects, although a longitudinal analysis that examines the same individuals over time ðsee Saperstein and Penner ½2012 for the United StatesÞ is more compelling in one sense, but, because it lacks information on color, it prevents analysis of whether fluidity occurs beyond only very light skinned persons. A concern with our method could be that by not fully controlling for phenotype, the regression coefficients for status could reflect residual reverse effects of racial classification on socioeconomic status. However, the addition of a hair type variable for Brazil did not alter the status effects, thus reassuring us that our model was sufficiently robust to test the status effects ðtable 4Þ. Table 1 shows the distribution of racial identification for respondents in the 2010 LAPOP survey, before excluding the indigenous respondents. The proportion identifying as white was similar in Brazil, Colombia, and PanBlack, White, or Mixed Race? ama at 31%-35% while it was only 11% in the Dominican Republic. Mestizo was the modal category in the three countries in which it was used, ranging from 44% in Panama to 64% in the Dominican Republic. The proportion that identified as black ranged from 8% in Colombia to 14% in Panama. The range of those identifying as mulato was wider, from 3% in Colombia and Panama to 11% in the Dominican Republic. In Brazil, where the categories were somewhat different, fully 48% identified as pardo. Moreover, variation in the ratio of blacks to mulatos was quite large, from about 5:1 in Panama to an almost even split in the Dominican Republic ð13:11Þ to Brazil, where the ratio of blacks to pardos was less than 1 : 4. Thus, mixed identities that denote some African ancestry were particularly common in Brazil and the Dominican Republic but were relatively rare in Colombia and especially in Panama.
We now turn to figure 1, which illustrates the skin color distribution of blacks, mulatos, mestizos, and whites in the four countries. The percentages for each category at each color point x are based on moving ðweightedÞ averages at that point ðxÞ plus the two adjacent points ðx 1 1, x 2 1Þ. We used moving averages to increase the number of cases in each skin color category since some color categories had very few cases. This created a smoothed distribution across the skin color spectrum and prevented fluctuations due to small samples. 22 While we focus on the findings for the black and mulato categories, these figures also include the categories of white ðin all countriesÞ and mestizo ðin the Spanish-speaking countriesÞ for reference. Figure 1 reveals a wide range in the association between skin color and identification. While there was substantial overlap in skin color among the NOTE.-Data are from 2010 and 2012 America's Barometer. In Brazil, pardo was used instead of mulato. In the Dominican Republic, there is no indigenous category, and respondents were sometimes prompted with the term Indio when they did not understand the term mestizo.
a Not in study sample for the remaining analysis.
groups in all countries, in all cases people who identified as black tended to be darker than those who identified as mulato, who tended to be darker than the white and mestizo populations. Even so, there was national variation in the color points at which persons identified as mulato and as black. More than 90% of the darkest ðskin color 5 9, 10, 11; shown by point 10Þ Panamanians self-identified as black compared to just over 60% in the Dominican Republic. Admittedly, the sample size for blacks at this end of the spectrum was small. 23 In Brazil and Colombia, about 80% of these darkest-skinned persons identified as black. In Brazil, nearly all of the remaining 20% who did not identify as black identified as pardo.
24 Moreover, the slope denoting change in identification as black across color gradients was particularly steep in Panama, further demonstrating the especially great importance of skin color to black self-identification in that country. 23 These persons represented on average about 4% of the sample populations of these countries. 24 This is hardly surprising since mestizo or a mestizo-like term was not used in that country's survey. Mulato identification seems to have had a particularly high level of fluidity. Figure 1 shows that persons identifying as mulato could be found in nearly every skin color category in the Spanish-speaking countries. In the Dominican Republic, a constant 10% identified as mulato in every skin color category. In Colombia and Panama, the few who identified as mulato ðas shown in table 1Þ were represented in constant amounts across much of the skin color spectrum. By contrast, the pardo category in Brazil appears more affected by skin color than mulato in the other countries. In Brazil, the percentage of people identifying as pardo rapidly increased from 20% to 80% by point 5 ðskin color 5 4, 5, 6Þ and then decreased to almost 20% of the darkest Brazilians ðskin color 5 9, 10, 11; shown by point 10Þ.
Figure 1 reveals that the distribution of self-identified pardos in Brazil was roughly the same as the population identifying in the combined mulato and mestizo categories in the Spanish-speaking countries. Thus, these figures suggest that pardo and mulato are not equivalent, despite the Brazilian government's and the black movement's assumption that pardo refers exclusively to persons of African descent ðTelles 2004Þ.
At the other end of the spectrum, about 80% of the lightest Brazilians and Panamanians identified as white ðskin color 5 1, 2, 3; shown by point 2Þ, while only 60% of Colombians and 40% of Dominicans did. There were almost no blacks ðnegros or pretosÞ in the lightest skin color points ð2, 3, 4Þ in any of the four countries, although there were considerable numbers of mestizos and pardos. These figures are consistent with Telles and Flores's ð2013Þ findings for who identifies as white. For the Spanish-speaking countries, figure 1 demonstrates that mestizo is less fluid than mulato but more fluid than white or black. Although mestizos ðand pardosÞ could be found across the entire color spectrum in all four countries, their numbers peaked in the middle categories ð5 and 6Þ, even though the proportion identifying as mestizo was relatively low in those categories.
Overall, findings depicted in figure 1 suggest that skin color and racial self-identification were most strongly related in Panama where the slopes for the distributions of self-identified whites, mestizos, and blacks were clearly the steepest. In contrast, skin color and racial identification seemed least related in the Dominican Republic, where the respective slopes were flattest. Brazil and Colombia revealed similar distributions except that the intermediate pardo category of Brazil was roughly equivalent to Colombia's mestizo and mulato category together.
Multinomial Regression Results
In the Spanish-speaking countries, we constructed multinomial regression models to predict identification as white, mulato, or black ðnegroÞ compared to mestizo; in Brazil, the regressions predicted identification as white American Journal of Sociology or black ðpretoÞ compared to pardo. We show means and standard deviations of the independent variables in table 2 and present our regression results in table 3. Table 2 shows variation in the characteristics of the populations in the four countries. The first row shows that, on average, Dominicans and Panamanians tended to be the darkest while Colombians were the lightest, although the standard deviations suggest much overlap in the color distribution of the four national populations. While Panamanians were probably the wealthiest, on average Colombians were the most educated, with 25.7% of respondents in the high-education bracket. Dominicans were the poorest and least educated, while Brazilians were equally poorly educated. Probably reflecting the fact that the color inequality in education is greater in Brazil than in Panama ðTelles and Steele 2012Þ, the darkest interviewers by far were in Panama while the lightest were in Brazil. The Year 2012 variable indicates that the number of respondents was similar in the 2010 and 2012 data, except in Brazil where the 2010 survey sampled a larger number of respondents. Table 3 shows that skin color was highly significant statistically and showed the expected association: persons identifying as white were the lightest, while those identifying as black were the darkest. Mulatos tended to be slightly darker than mestizos in Colombia and the Dominican Republic, but there was no difference in Panama. No other variable had such a consistent effect. However, the degree to which skin color mattered varied by country, which figure 1 had illustrated. Table 3 confirms those findings, showing that the coefficients for color in Panama were particularly high for identification as black, where the likelihood of identifying as black increased fully four times ð3.997Þ for each unit increase in color, whereas 3 shows that the models produced the best fit in Panama and the worst in the Dominican Republic, further revealing the extent to which skin color and the other variables predict racial identification across the four countries.
Regarding socioeconomic status, we found a variety of country-specific patterns. We begin by examining the wealth variable, which best captures the extent to which "money whitens." Table 3 shows that wealth whitened in Brazil from pardo to white and at a high level of statistical significance, thus partially supporting the findings in the classical literature for that country ðHarris 1952; Degler 1971Þ. Indeed, the likelihood of identifying as white increased by 15.6% for every unit of wealth gain, a considerable effect considering that the difference between 1 standard deviation below the mean and 1 standard deviation above is nearly five points. However, wealth had no effect on the pardo-black boundary, suggesting that "money whitens" only for Brazilians who are on the white/pardo side of the racial continuum. In contrast, wealth did not affect racial identification in Colombia, Panama, or the Dominican Republic.
In contrast, the results for education suggest that high education "blackened" in Brazil, although these results are significant at a P 5 .067 level. While these results do not seem robust, they present contradictory evidence to the idea that money whitens. We suspect that, if the survey had used the term negro instead of preto for black, the relationship between education and identification as black would be stronger. Moreover, as we will see, figure 2 and table 4 reveal a stronger positive relationship between high education and black self-identification, which is consistent with other findings showing an apparently new phenomenon in which higher status darkens in Brazil ðGuimarães 2012; Marteleto 2012Þ.
We found no relation between education and racial identification in Panama. This may be related to the especially strong effect of skin color found in Panama, which may leave relatively little room for status effects. For Colombia, we found that high education "mestizoizes," especially at the light end. Colombians with high education were nearly half ð.524Þ as likely to identify as white at a very high level of statistical significance, although the results suggest that they were also less ð.620 timesÞ likely to identify as black and at a level that was not statistically significant at the P < .05 level ðP 5 .094Þ.
In the Dominican Republic, the results for medium and high education in table 3 suggest that medium and high education darkened on the continuum from white to mulato. Those with higher education were also more likely to identify as black, but not to the same extent that they identified as mulato. These results were always statistically significant at high levels. Black, White, or Mixed Race?
Most notably, high-educated Dominicans were nearly four times ð3.905Þ as likely to identify as mulato when compared to low-educated Dominicans, while they were 1.689 times as likely to identify as black. Thus, our results for education support Howard's ð2001Þ and Simmons's ð2009Þ ethnographic observations that many middle-class Dominicans are beginning to identify as mulato, thus choosing a mixed-race category that explicitly recognizes African origin instead of the traditional category of Indio, which does not. We found that higher-educated Dominicans were also more likely to identify as black, as Simmons ð2009Þ also found, although not at the level of mulato self-identification. Finally, we discovered these status effects based on education but not on wealth or assets.
Since both wealth and education represent socioeconomic status, we calculated their combined effect. This was especially necessary in the case of Brazil, where the effect of these variables was divergent. We show the association between racial identification and socioeconomic status for the four countries, on the basis of the combined effects of education and wealth, in figure 2. These results were calculated using the STATA program CLARIFY on the basis of the regression models in table 3. CLARIFY pro-FIG. 2.-Predicted probabilities for identification in racial categories for high and low socioeconomic status in Brazil, Panama, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic. Predicted values were calculated for high and low socioeconomic status persons with a skin color of 6 and mean characteristics on all other variables in table 3. Low socioeconomic status is defined as having low education and a wealth score of 1 SD below the country's mean, and high socioeconomic status is defined as having high education and a wealth score of 1 SD above the country's mean. duces predicted probabilities based on stochastic simulations that account for uncertainty based on both randomness in the real world and from sample sizes ðKing, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000Þ. Figure 2 predictions were based on persons with a skin color of 6 ðthe color point where there blacks, mulatos, and mestizos are all most likely to be found togetherÞ, with all other variables held at the mean, except for wealth and education. The high-status predictions were modeled on persons with high education and a wealth score that was 1 standard deviation above the mean for each country, while persons of low status were those with low education and a wealth score that was 1 standard deviation below the mean.
Overall, figure 2 conveys our major findings: high status polarizes in Brazil, darkens in the Dominican Republic, mestizoizes in Colombia and has no effect in Panama. For Brazil, the polarizing effect of status is clearer in figure 2 : the pardo category shrank from 82.6% to 70.6%, while the NOTE.-Data are from a survey of Brazil from the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America ðPERLAÞ, Princeton University. SEs ðin parenthesesÞ adjusted for sample design that accounts for clustering and sample stratification using Huber-White estimation technique. N 5 919.
* P < .05 ðtwo-tailed testsÞ. ** P < .01. *** P < .001.
white ð12.3%-20.8%Þ and black categories ð5.0%-8.5%Þ grew with high status. The results from table 3 suggest more specifically that wealth whitens those at the white/pardo boundary, while education darkens at the pardo/black boundary. For Colombia, figure 2 shows that the mestizo category grew from 68.5% to 77.2% of the population, while the black and white categories shrank, although the latter may not be statistically significant. Figure 2 also shows that the combined effects of wealth and education for the Dominican Republic tended to darken, especially to mulato. The difference that status makes in the Dominican Republic was the largest observed among any of our four cases. Of particular note, the percentage of low-status Dominicans identifying in the mulato category was 9.8 compared to 24.1 of high-status Dominicans, which was mostly at the expense of mestizo/Indios, which shrank from 77.2% to 59.8%. Finally, figure 2 shows virtually no status effect in Panama. Overall, figure 2 also reveals that status did not affect identification for the large majority of persons, even in Brazil and the Dominican Republic. Since race may be based on other phenotypic criteria apart from skin color, we were concerned that the residual effect of socioeconomic status and other variables might be due to other differences in physical appearance beyond skin color. We also sought to understand the extent to which another phenotypic characteristic might affect racial classification. To address this, we took advantage of data collected by PERLA that featured an innovative variable: interviewer-rated hair type. From previous research, we know that hair type is particularly important in shaping racial identification and experiences of discrimination and that having kinky hair is an important criterion in classifying someone as black ðFiguereido 1994; Guimarães 2012Þ. Notably, a survey of Brazil found that Brazilians believed that hair type was the second most important criterion for determining race, after skin color ðGuimarães 2012Þ.
With data from the PERLA survey, we replicated the Brazil model of table 3 ðmodel 1Þ and added the variable kinky hair in model 2. The results in model 1 were generally similar to those of table 3 for Brazil. The most notable difference is that the magnitude of higher education was greater in table 4, where highly educated persons were more than three ð3.142Þ times as likely to identify as preto compared to those with low education, which compares to about 1.5 times in table 3. We believe that the greater choice of preto in the PERLA survey, which is designed to be about ethnoracial issues, may have been due to priming; by comparison, it was the first question among a small number of ethnoracial questions in the LAPOP survey questionnaire ðused in table 3Þ, which suggests the absence of priming. In particular, the closed-ended question in PERLA was immediately preceded by an open-ended racial identification question, which elicited many responses in the negro category ðanother black category in Brazil; data not shownÞ, which is especially popular among college-educated Brazilians who might not think of themselves as preto ðCicallo 2012Þ. As a result of that priming, respondents may have conflated the two terms when choosing preto in the PERLA survey.
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Model 2 of table 4 shows that kinky hair was statistically significant in all models, revealing that it is an important criterion of racial identification. It also shows the same effects as darker skin color, as we expected. Moreover, it did not appear to affect the relation of any of the other variables in the model with identification as white or black. That the education and wealth coefficients are robust to the inclusion of hair type is encouraging regarding our concerns about whether actual phenotype is sufficiently controlled to reasonably interpret status effects on racial identification. In comparison to the effect of skin color, it was not as powerful in predicting identification as black, but it was similar in strength for identification as white. In other words, although the coefficients for skin color and kinky hair were similar ð2.291 and 2.762, respectivelyÞ, the color effect represents a onepoint gain on the 11-point scale compared to the dichotomous scale for hair type. In contrast, persons with kinky hair were just over one-fifth ð.213Þ as likely to identify as white compared to pardo, while one shade darker on the color scale meant an almost 50% ð.458Þ likelihood of identifying as white. Considering the roughly twofold difference in the coefficients, these findings suggest that hair type is roughly equivalent to a two-point gain in skin color for differentiating whites from pardos. Finally, the Nagelkerke R 2 s in models 1 ð.641Þ and 2 ð.670Þ demonstrate that the addition of hair type slightly improved the fit of the model.
Other Effects
Our focus has been on the effects of color, country, status, and hair type on racial identification; the other independent variables shown in table 2 were intended as controls. We expected age to be important, with older people more likely to whiten and younger people, particularly in Brazil, more likely to darken. We found an age effect for identification as white in Brazil and as white and black in the Dominican Republic. Interestingly, older persons were more likely to identify as white in Brazil. In contrast, older Dominicans were less likely to identify as white than in the traditional mestizo/Indio category, and they were also more likely to prefer the black category. In all other cases, age had no statistically significant effects, despite our expectation that the rise of global multiculturalism and an emergent black movement might be increasing black identification among younger people. However, the lack of an age effect may indicate that these new social processes represent period effects that are not age specific. Finally, an increase in white and black identification among Dominicans from 2010 to 2012 probably reflects large changes in the sampling frame.
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Our control for interviewer's skin color sometimes yielded strong but inconsistent results. The results suggest that Brazilians and Colombians darkened themselves in the presence of darker interviewers, but Dominicans and Panamanians whitened. Specifically, respondents working with darker interviewers were less likely to identify as white in Brazil but more likely to identify as white in Panama and the Dominican Republic. While one might expect whitening in the presence of dark interviewers as the Dominican and Panamanian results suggest, the opposite may make sense in a more racially conscious Brazil, where darker interviewers may elicit greater identification as nonwhite. On the dark end of racial identification, Panamanians were only 80% ð.807Þ as likely to identify as black, but Colombians were 17% ð1.173Þ more likely to identify as mulato, in the presence of darker interviewers.
In most cases, where we found status effects, we also found gender effects. This suggests that particular boundaries are especially porous or are in the process of being redefined, although it is not clear why men are particularly likely to cross those boundaries. In particular, table 3 shows that Brazilian men were about a quarter ð1.236Þ more likely than women to identify as white, as were wealthier Brazilians. In contrast, Dominican men were more likely to identify as mulato rather than mestizo/Indio or black, which follows the status pattern of highly educated Dominicans being more likely to identify as mulato. This finding suggests that the growing mulato category in the Dominican Republic may be a particularly gendered as male, in the same way that mulata is gendered as female in Brazil. Despite the considerable literature on the ways in which women are racialized differently than men in Latin America ðFiguereido 1994; Viveros 2000; Caldwell 2007Þ, we still know very little about what this means for racial classification. We leave these interesting findings for future research.
In a separate regression analysis, we also considered the effects of immigration to the United States. As Simmons ð2009Þ and Roth ð2012Þ have claimed, immigrant transnationalism may be particularly important in shaping racial identity among Dominicans. As such, we included two vari-ables from the 2010 America's Barometer: whether respondents had relatives outside of their country or whether they received remittances from anyone abroad. Neither variable had an effect on Dominican racial classification, which we show in appendix tables A2 and A3, although U.S. remittances had a blackening effect in Panama. This does not deny that immigrant transnationalism has an effect on the Dominican Republic or elsewhere but suggests that the influence is not directly from immigrants themselves. If the influence does exist, it is probably more diffuse as in the transnational circulation of mestizaje ideas, black consciousness movements, and multicultural policies.
DISCUSSION
With these analyses we have sought to compare racial identification in four Latin American countries, using innovative survey data. Our results suggest that informal rules governing racial identification vary substantially across the four countries. While phenotype, particularly skin color, is the major determinant of racial identification in all four countries, we argue that country variations also reflect distinct racial schemas such as the importance of color and status as well as the relative prominence of mixedrace categories and the extent of fluidity.
These differences began with the distribution of racial categories across the four countries. We found that the frequency of identifying in mixed-race categories that are commonly understood as including African ancestry ðmulato and pardoÞ varied widely from only 3% of the populations of Panama and Colombia to nearly half of the population in Brazil.
27 Most Brazilians of intermediate skin color ð5-8Þ identified as pardo, compared to self-identification as mulato for about 10% of Dominicans and less than 5% of both Colombians and Panamanians. Moreover, we found that persons identifying in these categories were particularly ambiguous with respect to skin color in the Spanish-speaking countries, as self-identified mulatos were nearly evenly distributed among all color points. In contrast, while those who self-identified as pardos in Brazil could also be found at all skin color points, they were more concentrated among the respondents with intermediate skin color tones.
We also found that the pardo category in Brazil mapped onto the combined mulato and mestizo categories in the other three countries. Thus, persons who identify as mestizo and who would probably consider themselves of indigenous origin primarily are considered pardo in Brazil. An analysis of the historical definition of pardo ðStephens 1999; Nobles 2000Þ and its regular use among persons of light skin color in our study suggests that many pardos may be perceived as white, suggesting that pardo is not equivalent to mulato in the Spanish-speaking countries and calling into question its common usage by academics, the black movement, and policy makers for designating Afro-Brazilians ðTelles 2004Þ.
Color Elasticity
One of our main findings was the distinct relationship between racial identification and skin color across the four countries. In Panama, skin color was a particularly powerful predictor of racial identification relative to other variables; color elasticity was therefore low. In contrast, skin color was a relatively unreliable predictor of racial identification in the Dominican Republic, making color elasticity, and thus racial fluidity, relatively high. Color elasticity in Colombia and Brazil was intermediate. Thus, even though categories like black or white seem to represent persons of similar skin color across the four countries, our results indicate otherwise. In other words, although persons of the darkest skin tone in all four countries might be thought to be unambiguously "black," our results showed that such persons were consistently black in Panama but least so in the Dominican Republic, where dark skin color often did not mean black identity. Notwithstanding these differences, skin color mattered a great deal for racial identification in all four countries and, more than any other variable, consistently predicted who identified as black, mulato/pardo, mestizo, and white. 28 Moreover, we found little support for the prevailing idea that money whitens in Latin American countries. Rather, we discovered diverse patterns in the relation between status and racial identification, possibly reflecting changing meanings and incentives to identify with particular racial categories. We discovered that social status ðwealth and educationÞ polarizes-both whitens and darkens-in contemporary Brazil, that it darkens in the Dominican Republic, mestizoizes in Colombia, and has no effect in Panama. Despite long-standing evidence that money or status whitens in Brazil, that effect should not be generalized to Latin America or even to today's Brazil. Moreover, only none ðPanamaÞ to, at most, only one-fifth ðDominican RepublicÞ of the national samples were reclassified when com- 28 The continuing use of the one-drop rule by some has arguably meant color elasticity along the black-white boundary in the United States. Specifically, some light-skinned persons of partial African descent may be perceived as white or even identify as white and thus their classification is fluid, although the law previously determined them to be black and thus their racial classification was considered fixed. Perhaps color elasticity as a dimension of racial fluidity has been ignored because such color variation was not believed to affect who was considered black in the paradigmatic U.S. case. paring persons of high and low status. These findings thus call for rethinking the relationship between status and racial classification in Latin America. Indeed, whitening through status should not be seen as a rule but rather as malleable and still conditioned by nation-building narratives, popular understandings of race, and changing incentives for identifying with particular categories. These findings are notable because they are anchored in a fairly objective gauge of physical appearance-skin colorwhich seems to be the primary predictor of racial classification but has been remarkably absent from previous studies of racial classification/identification. Ideally, future research would examine how changes in status directly affect the same individuals over time ðassuming that their phenotype remains constantÞ and to what extent this occurs among a sample of individuals at varying points along the continuum of skin colors or phenotypes.
Explaining Country Differences
In order to make sense of these different patterns in racial identification, we highlight national features that have led to distinct racial schema in each country, including unique nation-building discourses, state policy interventions, the extent and nature of multiculturalism, and different degrees of mobilization by black movements. In recent years, a sudden turn to multiculturalism, especially in Colombia and Brazil, and the presence of black consciousness movements have challenged the logic of whitening by creating new nation-building narratives that promote black identity. These seem to be supplanting older ideas of mestizaje and whitening. In the same way that states' promotion of whitening can expand the boundaries around whiteness, black social movements may be expanding the boundaries around blackness. In light of changes that vary from new constitutional recognition of blacks to significant policy initiatives like Brazil's affirmative action, racial classification and identities in the region will continue to challenge earlier racial schema.
Our findings for Panama, where racial identification was especially rigid, are probably the most straightforward. In that country, color and racial identification were closely correlated, which means that color elasticity was the lowest. This left less room for ambiguity due to status or other variables than in the other three countries. Black identification was particularly sharp and differentiated from the white and mestizo categories, which had greater fluidity between them. Panamanians hardly used the mulato category, and when they did, it bore little relationship with skin color. With their low level of ambiguity and close relationship between color and racial identity for the black-nonblack distinction, our findings for Panama seem to confirm its historical legacy of U.S. domination and imposition of legal segregation in the early 20th century ðConniff 1985; Black, White, or Mixed Race?
O'Reggio 2006Þ, with virtually no contemporary multicultural policies to counter them. But, the widespread use of a mestizo, which occurred almost entirely among the light and intermediate skin tones, probably does not include many persons of obviously African origin, and status differences do not affect it, which appears to be consistent with the Panamanian nationbuilding narratives that emphasized only Spanish-indigenous mixture and ignored blackness ðPriestly and Barrow 2008Þ.
At the other extreme is the Dominican Republic, where we found the greatest fluidity-in color elasticity and sensitivity to status effects. More specifically, there was relatively little relationship between skin color and identification as mulato, suggesting that the boundaries around mulato are particularly blurry. This was clearly demonstrated in that mulatos were found in similar proportions in nearly all points on the skin color continuum. At the darkest end, less than half of the very darkest Dominicans identified as black, while the majority identified as mestizo/Indio. These findings are consistent with Dominican nation-building narratives which emphasize that Dominicans evolved only from Spanish and indigenous peoples, while Haitians are the black "other"; most Dominicans have been routinely classified as Indio in government identity cards ðHoward 2001Þ.
However, we did find that high-status persons darkened in the Dominican Republic. This suggests that as more educated Dominicans begin to recognize an African past, they are more likely to identify as mulato ðand, to some extent, as blackÞ rather than Indio. The tendency for high-status persons to identify as black is weaker than identification as mulato, suggesting that many stop short of the black category, which has been traditionally reserved for Haitians. This finding confirms ethnographic studies that noted a tendency for the middle class to begin identifying as mulato and even as black in some cases ðHoward 2001; Simmons 2009Þ. It may also reflect constant interaction with Americans and immigration to the United States, especially immigration to New York, where Dominicans are often racialized as black ðCandelario 2007; Roth 2012Þ, although we did not find direct evidence to support this.
In Brazil, well-known narratives of race mixture and racial democracy, where racism was explicitly denied, probably account for the wide use of its mixed-race category and the moderate relation between color and racial identification. Our findings also suggest, though, that greater socioeconomic status has polarized Brazilians away from a mixed-race category and toward white and black categories. Moreover, status effects were greater in the direction of blackening than whitening; we found that wealth whitened while education darkened in Brazil. Brazil's polarization into black and white categories by high status thus seems to combine a traditional pattern of money whitening ðHarris 1952; Degler 1971Þ with a more recent ðand largerÞ effect of education darkening, leading overall to racial identification by status that moves away from the white and mixed-race category ðpardoÞ. This latter tendency may be the result of multicultural policies, especially affirmative action, that have begun to change the direction of the relation between status and racial classification. In particular, Brazil's major multicultural policy has been affirmative action in higher education, which is aimed at the middle class. Also, black consciousness movements in Brazil have tended to be directed mostly at the middle classes. The result of increasing identity as black rather than pardo or mulato effectively challenges Brazil's traditional race mixture narrative.
We found an interesting pattern of mestizoization in Colombia. Perhaps higher-status Colombians are more likely to classify as mestizo because they are conscious of national narratives of mestizaje that glorify the mestizo as the national protagonist embodying Colombian development and progress ðWade 1993Þ, while low-status persons may find white identity to be a particularly valuable source of capital ðTelles and Flores 2013Þ. Thus, both categories are valued although in different ways. According to Wade ð1993Þ, Colombian ideas or narratives of mestizaje are ðparadoxicallyÞ also of a whitened mestizo nation that has sought to erase blackness and indigenousness from the nation, so that mestizoization might be interpreted as whitening. However, our status results for Colombia are mostly confined to those from white to mestizo and indicated no significant status effects for the minority categories of black and mulato, which we consider more meaningful for capturing the whitening phenomenon. This may be due to the fact that race-based policies in Colombia have been aimed at both the urban middle class ðaffirmative action and other policiesÞ and the rural black populations ðcollective land rights and natural resourcesÞ; if there has been darkening of racial classification in recent years, it may be occurring among high and low status persons.
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CONCLUSION
Most Latin American countries share a history in which states did not institutionalize racial categories in the postindependence period. Instead, they developed mestizaje projects that profoundly shaped racial identity and relations in this region. Despite this, in this article, we move beyond the idea that Latin America is homogenous and an exceptional case of racial formation. Using a novel data set of nationally representative surveys, we examine how several social and political factors are associated 29 While collective land rights for escaped slave communities ðquilombolasÞ in Brazil have been recognized, these policies have largely been stalled. with distinct racial self-identification patterns in four countries with large black or Afro-descendant populations: Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Panama.
We develop the framework of racial schemas and color elasticity to make sense of the divergent patterns of racial identification in these four cases. In so doing, we make several contributions to understandings about racial classification. First, our findings challenge the idea of a single Latin American variant of race relations, which is often seen in opposition to the United States ðHoetink 1967; Harris 1974; Bonilla Silva 2004; Patterson 2005Þ . Beyond some similarities in racial mixture ðmestizajeÞ narratives, the four countries we compare here seem to have developed racial schemas that map onto distinct kinds of mestizaje projects, unique histories of state intervention, and different degrees of mobilization by ethnoracial social movements. We believe that these differences are key for understanding the distinct patterns of racial identification we found. In this way, the literature on racial fluidity and whitening, which has largely analyzed the specific case of Brazil, should not be generalized to Latin America. Rather, further research should not only continue to ask whether findings on Brazil have any resonance with the social realities of other countries in the region but should also begin to theorize which, if any, features of racial identity are commonly held within the region. Beyond national processes, the recent politicization of black identity-through social movements and state policies-is also happening in an increasingly transnational context. Second, while we have shown racial fluidity in the four countries, the degree of such fluidity should not be exaggerated. Our findings for Panama, which show that color elasticity was low-skin color mapped nearly directly onto racial identification-complicate the idea that race is particularly fluid in Latin America. This contrasts clearly with the Dominican Republic, with its high color elasticity, where even very dark skin people often did not identify as black. While our analysis of the distribution of racial identification across skin color suggested some varying degrees of ambiguity and overlap between racial categories in all of the four countries we examined, our regression analysis strongly suggested that phenotype-in particular skin color and hair type-is the primary determinant of racial identity in all four Latin American countries, although the extent of its primacy varies within the region.
Third, our results call for a rethinking of the relationship between racial identification and social status in these countries. Indeed, despite the longstanding and popular idea that money whitens, we discovered four distinct patterns, none of which supported a simple "money whitening" story. Our results reveal that the relation between race and status largely depends on the national context. We found that fluidity varies on this dimension from Panama, where we found no status effects, to the Dominican Republic, where status effects resulted in different racial identification for about onefifth of the population. In Brazil where the "money whitens" idea is pervasive, a growing awareness of racism, positive black identity, and affirmative action in higher education has actually created an "education darkening" effect. Thus, our results suggest that whitening through status should be seen not as a rule in Latin America but rather as malleable and apparently conditioned by nationalist narratives, popular understandings of race, and changing incentives for identifying with particular categories.
Finally, we have sought to decenter our analysis away from the United States, which has been the paradigmatic case for understanding racial classification. Ideally, we would have included the United States as a fifth case, but we did not have comparable data to do so. Yet while we do not know for sure where the United States would fit alongside the four Latin American countries we examine, our findings here, as well as other evidence, suggest that we can no longer assume that flexibility is necessarily greater in Latin America than in the United States. Certainly, the United States is different because it adopted classification rules based on hypodescent. However, the fall of the "one-drop rule" in legal institutionsalthough its continuing use is arguably color elastic-as well as changes in demography and informal norms seem to suggest that the racial schema of the United States is becoming more fluid. More specifically, the recognition of multiracial identities ðDaniel 2006Þ, the inability of Latinos to fit into U.S. racial categories ðRodriguez 2000Þ, and even instability across the black-white boundary ðHarris and Sim 2002; Saperstein and Penner 2012Þ all point to a degree of fluidity in the United States that may even exceed that in Panama. If we consider the past, the use of a mulato category by 20%-30% of the U.S. population of African origin ðblack/negro 1 mulattoÞ in the late 19th century ðSaperstein and Gullickson 2013Þ is similar to that found in Panama and Colombia today.
As we have mentioned throughout this article, our findings reflect a rapidly changing political and social context in each of these countries, especially in Brazil and Colombia. Black consciousness movements have been successful in creating counter-narratives that promote black identity and thus challenge nation-centered initiatives that have promoted whitening and money whitening. Moreover, the recent turn toward multiculturalist and racial equality policies seems to be replacing older ideas of mestizaje and whitening. In this way, the state is not the only actor in the making and remaking of racial schemas and thus of racial classification and identification. In the same way that states' promotion of whitening can expand the boundaries around whiteness, black social movements may be expanding the boundaries around blackness. Future changes in state policies, nationalist narratives, and social movement actions are likely to further shift national racial schemas and classification systems. NOTE.-SEs ðin parenthesesÞ adjusted for sample design that accounts for clustering and sample stratification using Huber-White estimation technique.
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